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ABSTRACT

An overview of four models of naturalistic evaluation of arts education is presented for visual arts education administrators: illuminative, responsive, criticism, and naturalistic. The first method is illuminative evaluation. It focuses on description and interpretation, rather than standardized measurement and control. Concentrating on the crucial concepts of the instructional system and the learning milieu, it is flexible enough to evaluate any situation. Responsive evaluation focuses on arts education. The evaluator gathers data from the educational setting and responds to program activities, testimonies, and other stimuli in the educational setting. It is narrative and relies upon data obtained through participant-observation and interviews. The responsive evaluator makes no judgments about the educational value of the information obtained. He or she provides the school district decision makers with the information they requested in the evaluation. Educational criticism consists of the interrelated components of description, interpretation, and evaluation. The educational critic relies on perceptive skills honed by knowledge and experience. An educational criticism consists of descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative sections. Naturalistic evaluation is claimed to be more suitable to most social, behavioral or artistic phenomena than are rationalistic axioms. Naturalistic evaluation is a qualitative, rather than quantitative approach. (DWH)

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THE POTENTIAL OF NATURALISTIC METHODS FOR EVALUATING
VISUAL ARTS EDUCATION PROGRAMS

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The Potential of Naturalistic Methods for Evaluating Visual Arts Education Programs

Introduction

This paper is intended to provide visual arts education administrators with an overview of various methods of naturalistic evaluation. Especially in this era of program cut backs, visual arts administrators must present the public with concrete information on the educational consequences of arts programs. It is our contention that traditional scientific methods of evaluation fail to capture many aspects of the educational activities which take place in visual arts programs. Scientific methods of evaluation are nomothetic. That is, these forms of evaluation attempt to find general laws and principles which can be uniformly applied in evaluating classroom life. Such methods often fail to capture the unique aspects of a classroom. Naturalistic methods of evaluation are idiographic. They attempt to capture the particular characteristics of an educational situation. Given that prime importance is often placed on the unique artistic responses of the individual art student (especially after he or she has learned basic skills and vocabulary), visual arts administrators would profit from knowledge of evaluation methods which can provide information on the unique and idiosyncratic characteristics of student learning in art.

Theoretical formulation is another important reason for utilizing naturalistic modes of evaluation. Unlike evaluation methods which rely on preformed (or a priori) theories about which teacher, student or program characteristics are important to study, naturalistic methods derive this information from the particular context being evaluated. Given the paucity of theoretical models on which teacher, student and program characteristics of visual arts program actually contribute to educational success, naturalistic methods can generate theoretical views which can contribute to our understanding in these areas. For example, Flander's method of evaluation is based upon a theoretical view that revolves around the importance of teacher-talk, teacher-questioning, etc.. Although some of these aspects may be important in a visual arts program, other aspects like teacher demonstration, or teacher modeling may also be important. By using naturalistic methods which focus on the particular qualities of a classroom, these as yet undocumented aspects can be explored.

Naturalistic methods are also beneficial in evaluating visual arts programs in that such programs tend to vary considerably from teacher to teacher and educational setting to educational setting. As we all know, some art teachers focus on perceptual development, some on knowledge of art history concepts, some on technical skills, some on multicultural understanding, and so forth. By using naturalistic evaluation methods, one can evaluate the particular educational effects of the particular program under review rather than using a method which may be evaluating apples by the criteria of oranges. For example, if one used a preformed system of evaluation which focused on what kinds of art history skills the students were acquiring, one might miss all of the educationally significant aspects which a teacher who focused on technical skills might be teaching.

There is an additional impetus for a move to increased use of naturalistic models of evaluation. In times of profound fiscal cutbacks, declining enrollments and community pressures for the "back-to-basics" movement, visual arts education programs and teachers find themselves under fire. They have been asked to justify programs and substantiate program expenditures with "hard" evidence of the program's contribution to a wholistic but lean educational curriculum. Visual arts educators have turned increasingly to various evaluation methods to supply these data.

But in turning to evaluation, arts educators have run aground on the rocky reefs of scientific method. The nature of a visual arts education program is clearly grounded in artistic, and not scientific, aims. The function of scientific method is primarily nomothetic, while the function of arts education is primarily idiographic, relying on the idiographic, the intensely personal and experiential, and the expressive. As a result, traditional scientific methods have often failed to provide the kind of evidence which teachers of art have needed, or felt was appropriate. Art educators have sensed the value dysjunction between what they have tried to teach and the methods they used to evaluate. Expressive objectives call for approaches which are more expressive and less instrumental, which are capable of deriving meaning from experience, and which are wholistic rather than fragmentary.

Clearly, naturalistic methods have great potential for evaluating arts programs. Before we turn to a brief description of the different types of naturalistic evaluation methods which have been formulated, a discussion of the differing assumptions which underlie naturalistic and scientific methods

should provide a clearer view of the functions of each. Both naturalistic and scientific methods of evaluation have a place in the evaluation of visual arts programs. Our purpose here is merely to provide the reader with some information on the former methods. We are not advocating that these naturalistic methods should replace scientific methods, but, rather, that utilizing both methods may be more appropriate if we are to obtain a total picture of classroom life.

Differences Between Scientific and Naturalistic Methods

Those deeply involved with forms of disciplined inquiry in education have tended to adopt the paradigm utilized by the hard or physical sciences, the so-called scientific or rationalistic paradigm. But a new paradigm for disciplined inquiry, one which we believe comes closer to taking account of social, behavioral and artistic life, is emerging. This paradigm, first explicated by Guba and Lincoln (1981) is called naturalistic, although it has also been called the case study, qualitative, or phenomenological paradigm. Its main characteristics are that it differs on certain basic assumptions or axioms, and, slightly less important, takes different postures on certain issues which, while neither as crucial or basic as axioms, are nevertheless fundamental to understanding how the naturalistic evaluator proceeds.

Those basic assumptions or axioms are five in number. Axioms may be defined as the set of undemonstrated (and undemonstratable) propositions accepted by convention or established by practice as the basic building blocks of some conceptual or theoretical structure or system. As such they are arbitrary and certainly not "self-evidently true." Different axiom systems have different utilities depending on the phenomenon to which they are applied. Any decision about which of several axiom systems to employ for given purposes is a matter of the relative "fit" between the axiom sets and the characteristics of the problem and context. It is a contention of naturalists that the axioms of naturalistic evaluation provide a better fit to most social, behavioral, or artistic phenomena than do the rationalistic axioms.

Axiom 1: The Nature of Reality.

Rationalists assume that there exists a single, tangible reality fragmentable into independent variables and processes, any of which can be studied inde-

pendently of the others; inquiry or evaluation can be caused to converge onto this single reality until, it is understood and explained. Naturalists on the other hand, assume that there exist multiple realities which are, in the main, constructions existing in the minds of people: they are therefore intangible and can be studied only in wholistic, and idiosyncratic, fashion; inquiry into these multiple realities will inevitably diverge (the scope of the inquiry or evaluation will enlarge) as more and more realities must be considered. Naturalists argue that while the rationalist assumptions undoubtedly have validity in the hard and life sciences, naturalist assumptions are more meaningful in studying human behavior. Naturalists do not deny the reality of the objects, events, or processes with which people interact, but suggest that it is the meanings given to or interpretations made of these objects, events, or processes that constitute the arena of interest to investigators of social/behavioral phenomena.

Axiom 2: The Inquirer-Respondent Relationship.

The rationalist assumes that the evaluator can maintain a discrete and inviolable distance from the "object" of evaluation; when the object is a human being, special methodological safeguards must be taken to prevent reactivity. The naturalist assumes that the evaluator and the respondent in any human inquiry inevitably interact to influence one another. While safeguards need to be mounted in both directions, the interaction need not be eliminated (it is impossible to do that anyway) but should be exploited for the sake of the evaluation. Naturalists point out that the proposition of subject-object independence is dubious and the effect is certainly more noticeable in dealing with people. Nor should it be supposed that the interpolation of a layer of apparently objective instrumentation (paper and pencil tests) solves the problem. Evaluators react to the mental images they have of respondents in developing the instrumentation; respondents answer or act in terms of what they perceive to be expectations held for their behavior as they interpret the meaning of the items or tasks put before them, and so on. Nor, say the naturalists, is interactivity a generally undesirable characteristic, because it is precisely the interactivity that makes it possible for the human instrument to achieve maximum responsiveness, adaptability, and insight.

Axiom 3: The Nature of Truth Statements.

Rationalists assert that the aim of inquiry is to develop a nomothetic body of knowledge; this knowledge is best encapsulated in generalizations which are truth statements that have enduring value and that are context-free. Generalizations are based on the similarity among units; differences are set aside as random variations or intrinsically uninteresting. Naturalists assert that the aim of inquiry or evaluation is to develop an idiographic body of knowledge; this knowledge is best described as a series of "working hypotheses" that describe the individual classroom or case. Generalizations are not possible since human behavior is never time or context free. Nevertheless, some transferability of working hypotheses from context to context may be possible depending on the similarity of the contexts (an empirical matter). Differences are as inherently important (and at times more important) than are similarities. Even in the hard or life sciences, as Cronbach (1975) has pointed out, generalizations are much like radioactive materials. They decay and have a half-life. And analogous tendencies exist in the social/behavioral sciences.

Axiom 4: Causality.

For the rationalist, the determination of cause-effect relationships is of prime importance; for each effect, it is assumed, there is a cause which can, given sufficiently sophisticated inquiry, be detected. The ultimate form of demonstrating cause-effect relationships is the experiment. The naturalist asserts that the determination of cause-effect is often a search for the Holy Grail. Human relationships are caught up in such an interacting web of factors, events, and processes that the hope that "the" cause-effect chain can be sorted out is vain; the best the evaluator can hope to establish are plausible patterns of influence. Naturalists point out that there have been a variety of cause-effect theories proposed since the original simplistic "if-then" formulation. All have flaws; however, the attributional and semantic formulations provide some insight into the possibility that if the realities with which humans deal are constructed, so, most likely, are their ideas of causation. Naturalists feel the best they can do is be persuasive. Causality can never be demonstrated in the "hard" sense; only patterns of plausible influence can be inferred.

Axiom 5: Relation to Values.

Rationalists assume that evaluation, like inquiry, is value-free and can be guaranteed to be so by virtue of the "objective" methodology which the rationalist employs. The naturalist asserts that not only is evaluation influenced by the values of both evaluator and his respondents, there is in fact an interaction between the values underlying the substantive theory guiding the evaluation, the values underlying the methodological paradigm, and the values that characterize the classroom or context in which the evaluation occurs. If these values are resonant there is no problem, but if they are dissonant, misleading or useless findings will likely result. So long as methodologies are assumed to be value free, the problem of value-resonance/dissonance cannot exist, by definition. But once the role that values play in shaping evaluation is recognized, the naturalist asserts, this problem becomes very real.

These five axioms form the basis for naturalistic evaluation, as their rationalistic counterparts form the basis for scientific inquiry. As we noted earlier, axioms are neither demonstrable nor provable, they are simply "givens" which guide inquiry or evaluation behavior in framing problems, or deriving findings or conclusions.

Postures, on the other hand, differ from axioms. They are not logically necessary to the integrity of the paradigm nor are they important to assess in determining fit between a paradigm and the area proposed to be studied. Nevertheless they characterize the "style" of the two paradigms for research and evaluation and are "congenial" or reinforcing to the practice of each. There are many postures but six are of special importance.

Methods preferred.

Rationalists tend to prefer quantitative methods, probably because of their apparently greater precision and objectivity and because of the advantage of being mathematically manipulable. Naturalists prefer qualitative methods, probably because they appear to promise the most wholistic products and they seem more appropriate to the use of a human as the prime data collection instrument. The distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods is often mistakenly taken to be the chief mark of distinction between the paradigms. In fact, the two dimensions are orthogonal; methods can be used in the service of either paradigm.

Source of Theory.

Rationalists insist on a priori formulations of theory; indeed, they are likely to assert that inquiry or evaluation without a priori theory to guide it is mindless. The naturalist believes that it is not theory but the evaluation problem itself that guides and bounds the inquiry; that a priori theory constrains the inquiry or evaluation to those elements recognized by the evaluator as important, and may introduce biases. In all events, theory is more powerful when it arises from the data rather than being imposed on them.

Knowledge Types Used.

Rationalists limit the type of knowledge admissible in an inquiry or evaluation to propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge that can be stated in linguistic form. In view of their commitment to a priori theory and their interest in shaping evaluations preordinately about particular questions and hypotheses, this is not surprising. The naturalist often intent on the use of the human-as-instrument, additionally admits tacit knowledge--insights, intuitions, apprehensions that cannot be stated in language form initially but which are nevertheless "known" to the evaluator.

Instruments.

The scientist prefers non-human devices for data collection purposes, usually because they appear to be more cost-efficient, have a patina of objectivity, and can be systematically aggregated. The naturalist prefers humans as instruments, because of their greater insightfulness, flexibility, and responsiveness, and because they are able to take a wholistic view, are able to utilize their tacit knowledge, and are able simultaneously to acquire and process information. Obviously both sets of advantages are meaningful; and the astute evaluator will seek opportunities to exploit both.

Design.

The scientist insists on a preordinate or preformed design. The naturalist, entering the field without a priori theory, or hypotheses is unable to specify a design (except in the broadest process sense) in advance. Instead, he anticipates that the design will emerge as the inquiry proceeds, with each step heavily dependent on all preceding steps. Clearly, the naturalist is well advised to specify as much in advance as possible, but the rationalist should also seek to keep as many options open as possible.

Setting.

While the scientist prefers to conduct studies under laboratory conditions, or at least with as much control as possible, the naturalist prefers natural settings (it is this propensity that has lent its name to the paradigm), arguing that only in nature can one discover what does happen rather than what can happen. Moreover, studies in nature can be transferred to other, similar contexts, whereas laboratory studies can be generalized only to other laboratories. While both kinds of studies have utility it is as important to know what does happen as what can happen.

The preceding axioms may be thought of as defining the paradigm, while the postures may be thought of as describing the ways and places in which it is most often carried out. But readers interested in pursuing newer and more phenomenologically-oriented models may well ask: But how can I find an approach within the naturalistic paradigm which will lend some guidance in thinking through the conduct of an evaluation? The answer is that there are several models of evaluation available, the underlying assumptions of which seem to fall within the naturalistic system. Among the most prominent and clearly explicated are those of Parlett and Dearden (Introduction to Illuminative Evaluation: Studies in Higher Education, 1975); Robert Stake's (Evaluating the Arts in Education: A Responsive Approach, 1975); the educational criticism and connoisseurship model of Elliot Eisner (The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs, 1979), and; the axioms, methodologies, and case study exemplars offered by Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln (Effective Evaluation: Improving the Usefulness of Evaluation Results Through Responsive and Naturalistic Approaches, 1981). Each of these models will be briefly explored and a brief bibliography for readers interested in further exploration will be developed.

Four Models for Evaluating Arts Education

Illuminative evaluation

Malcolm Parlett and Garry Deardon have edited a small but rich collection of papers on this approach under the title Introduction to Illuminative Evaluation (1977). According to the editors, this approach was specifically developed to evaluate three kinds of programs: "(1) those which have complex

goals that are difficult to define precisely; (2) programs that are significantly distorted by the local character of the institution or dominated by other 'special' influences; and (3) programs which are clearly not suitable as candidates for formalized evaluation designs because, for instance, of lack of time, a paucity of standard data, or simply because of uncertainty about the precise questions to be answered by the evaluation exercise" (1977, p. ii). Clearly, many arts education programs fall into one or more of these categories.

Parlett and Dearden argue that traditional experimental models of evaluation have led to findings which ultimately prove "artificial and restricted in scope" (p. 10), since they rely on a paradigm which fails to: (1) take account of the multitude of factors within a context which impinge upon a program; (2) take account of ongoing program change before and during the evaluation and which; (3) do not take account of data not listed as part of the variables, but which may be important.

Illuminative evaluation, on the other hand, takes account of a broader scope and more enlarged social and educational context. Its focus is on "description and interpretation" rather than standardized measurement and control. It attempts to portray, to highlight the entire range of salient program characteristics, to clarify the processes of educational programs and to display or illuminate the entire range of complex questions, advantages and disadvantages of innovations. The focus is on two crucial concepts, that of the instructional system and that of the wider program context, called the learning milieu. For Parlett and Dearden, the importance of the instructional system is that it rarely, if ever, exists as originally described, but is rather a system undergoing constant revision and dynamic change. The implication for the evaluator is that he must focus on the program as implemented, rather than the entity originally described. The importance of the learning milieu, on the other hand, is that it comprises a "network" of all the "cultural, social, institutional and psychological variables: which constitute the environment, each of which may possess importance to the descriptive and interpretive task. This latter concept is important simply because it recognizes and takes

account of the mutual interdependence of teacher, student, institution and processes of education.

As a general evaluation strategy, it is flexible enough to meet any situation without overly constraining methods. The authors characterize illuminative evaluations as occurring in three (possibly overlapping) stages: "investigators observe, inquire further, then seek to explain" (p. 17). In moving through these stages, the evaluator seeks to de-emphasize, or abandon entirely, experimentalism, and rather adopt the social anthropology methods of observation, interview, documentary analysis, and the like. He is interested primarily in the reconstruction of meanings and interpretations and in the creation of explanation and understanding. The purpose to be served by such understanding is more useful and informed decisionmaking, although the evaluator's focus must necessarily be on data collection and information gathering. As Parlett and Dearden summarize,

"The task is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex reality (or realities) surrounding the program . . . to sharpen discussion, disentangle complexities, isolate the significant from the trivial, and to raise the level of sophistication of debate" (p. 24).

Responsive Evaluation

Robert Stake's book, Evaluating the arts in education: A responsive approach (1975), is one of the few evaluation texts which focus on arts education. Stake contrasts his method of responsive evaluation with what he labels as preordinate evaluation. Stake defines preordinate evaluation methods as those which stress determining whether or not preordained goals have been met. He cites Ralph Tyler, Benjamin Bloom and James Popham as exemplars of the preordinate evaluation model. These evaluators prepare formal goal statements (usually in terms of student behavior or program goals) and then proceed to introduce some type of test (what Stake calls stimulus) in order to obtain information on whether or not these preordained goals have been met.

In contrast, responsive evaluation does not rely upon the answers of students or teachers to introduced stimuli such as tests to obtain information. Rather, the classroom or educational setting is the stimulus and the evaluator gathers data from the direct stimulus (i.e. the educational setting)

rather than obtaining data from a stimulus such as a test which has reduced the educational situation into a set of categories or test items. The responsive evaluator responds to program activities, testimonies, and other available stimuli found in the educational setting.

Stake states that responsive evaluation:

Will be particularly useful during formative evaluation when the art education staff needs help in monitoring the program, and when no one is sure what problems will arise. It will be particularly useful in summative evaluation when audiences want an understanding of a programs activities, its strengths and shortcomings, and when the evaluator feels that it is his responsibility to provide a vicarious experience. (Stake, 1975, p. 29).

Responsive evaluation is especially useful for providing information on process variables that may be undeterminable without actual participant-observation in the educational setting. The format of responsive evaluations is generally narrative in character and relies upon data obtained through participant-observation and interviews.

Stake's method of evaluation is responsive both in the sense that the evaluator responds directly to the educational setting and in the sense that the evaluator responds to the needs of those who have requested the evaluation. Unlike some other methods of naturalistic evaluation, Stake's position is that the evaluator should gather only that information requested by those who have asked for the evaluation to be conducted. The responsive evaluator is not to make judgments about the educational value of the information he or she has obtained. It is the responsive evaluator's job to respond to the requests of those who want information by responding to the educational situation. It is not the job of the responsive evaluator to assess the worth of the program under review. This is the responsibility of the decision makers in the district. The responsive evaluator merely provides them with his or her response to those aspects of the program which he or she is requested to respond to. It is the responsibility of those in the district to assess whether or not what the responsive evaluator has portrayed is educationally worthwhile.

Educational criticism

Educational criticism is a model of educational evaluation developed by E.W. Eisner. It is based on the model of art criticism and consists of the three interrelated components of description, interpretation and evaluation. Just as an art critic must have had extensive experiences with works of art (often called connoisseurship) in order to discern aspects of art works, likewise, the educational critic (the name given to those who do educational criticism) must be a connoisseur of education if he or she is to discern aspects of educational life. Instead of relying upon a pre-categorized instrument to focus his or her attention, the educational critic relies on perceptive skills sharpened by knowledge and experience.

However, just as one may be a connoisseur of art but not have the skills necessary to communicate the perceived experiences, an educational critic must be more than a connoisseur. He or she must have the writing skills necessary for communicating the perceived aspects of a classroom. Educational connoisseurship is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for being an educational critic.

Basically, the educational critic gathers information in much the same way as other naturalistic evaluators. Participant observation, interviewing, and the like are all a part of the process. The difference between the educational critic and other naturalistic evaluators comes in the communication of this information to others. The writing of an educational criticism requires writing and evaluative skills not stressed in some other evaluation methods.

After gathering data from the educational setting, the educational critic writes the descriptive portion of an educational criticism. The descriptive portion is to be written in such a way that the reader can vicariously experience those aspects of the educational situation which the educational critic describes. The situation is similar to an art critic trying to describe the art work in such a way that the reader who has not seen the work will be able to understand the interpretations and evaluations which the critic will make. The task of constructing such a description involves

the skillful use of words so as to provide an actual experience of the situation being described rather than abstracted information about that experience. One might think of it in terms of the difference between a newspaper report on Vietnam and a non-fiction autobiography by someone who was there.

The descriptive portion of an educational criticism is followed by the interpretive section. The interpretive aspect of an educational criticism provides a theoretical analysis of what has been described. For example, drawing from theory and research, the description might portray the teacher as one who engages in satire. The interpretive aspect would review theories and research on satire in order to provide a theoretical and empirical base for how satire has been defined and analyzed by other authors.

Finally, in the evaluative section of an educational criticism, the educational critic appraises the educational value of what has been described and interpreted. Unlike responsive evaluators, educational critics are to take a prescriptive stance on whether or not what has been perceived is or is not educationally desirable.

Clearly, there are many issues which need to be considered in choosing educational criticism as a mode of evaluation. Like other naturalistic approaches, issues of cost, generalizability, and training of evaluators must be considered. Yet, the mere consideration of educational criticism and its model of vicarious participation through artistic discourse, widens our conception of the kinds of information on classroom life which might be important. As Eisner states:

If the forms of perception, conception and expression define the content of what we know, then not only is artistic discourse relevant for revealing the qualities that constitute educational practice but so too are film, video and drama. Perhaps the major virtue of educational criticism is that it expands our understanding of how we come to know and, as a consequence, makes new avenues for educational evaluation and research possible (Eisner, 1979, p.19).

Naturalistic evaluation

The basic tenets--both axioms and postures--of this type of evaluation were treated extensively in the second section of this paper, and there is little

need for a review here. There are, however, features of naturalistic evaluation which are well worth reviewing for those unfamiliar with Guba and Lincoln's Effective Evaluation (1981).

The first formal educational evaluation models used in the United States focussed strongly on advance organizers such as objectives (cf., Tyler, Popham, and Metfessel and Michael). Successive generations of such models used as their advance organizers such elements as decisions to be made (Stufflebeam and others, Cronbach); effects, both intended and unintended (Scriven); political transactions (Rippl and others, Wolf); appreciation and critical guideposts (Eisner); and concerns and issues in the minds of program stakeholders (Stake, Guba and Lincoln). For Guba and Lincoln, the function of evaluation is to gather information relevant to the concerns and issues in the minds of stakeholding persons or groups. These individuals are called the stakeholding audience of the evaluation. A concern is any matter of interest or importance to one or more parties; an issue is any statement, proposition, or focus that allows for the presentation of different points of view. In other words, any proposition about which reasonable persons may disagree, or any point of contention.

Judgments regarding either the merit--intrinsic value--or worth--value to the context in which it is operating--of a program rely heavily on belief systems and value positions. Concerns and issues in the minds of those affected by the program also grow out of deeply-held value positions, attitudes, and beliefs. As a result, the evaluator's main charge is to portray the concerns and issues in terms of value conflicts which inhere in all social contexts and to display the range of judgments which could be made about the worth of a program, depending on the values one (or a given group) might hold. The interplay of values, beliefs and judgments of worth is inescapable for the naturalistic evaluation.

Users of this formulation of evaluation, like those in other models discussed, will be inclined to rely on methods which support the underlying axioms. Those methods will be, in the main, qualitative; they will include predomi-

nantly human-to-human research skills (interviewing, observation, and recording of non-verbal behavior) and artifactual skills (such as documentary analysis, records usage and unobtrusive measures). The argument for heavy reliance on qualitative measures grows from both the need for theory grounded in data, and the desire for a value resonance between the problem and data collection methods.

As a logical outgrowth of this model, the evaluation effort is grounded in those issues most salient to persons and groups upon whom the program has impact. In this way, judgments of program merit and worth are inevitable noted in terms of community preferences and values.

Conclusions

The art educators who find themselves in the difficult position of having to justify their programs in the face of fiscal cut-backs need a wide variety of armaments in their data collection and information processing arsenal. Each of these four models offers an expanded view of the evaluation process which we believe is both timely and congenial to the goals of visual arts education. Visual arts personnel can, we believe, amass powerful evidence with these models and techniques which can be expressed in the language, metaphor and feeling tone of the discipline (rather than the quantitative dialogue of the hard sciences). To the end that naturalistic evaluation conveys a vicarious experience of the program to its audiences, enhances understanding of the programs aims and purposes, and communicates needed and persuasive information to decisionmakers, it is a serviceable and worthwhile use of resources.

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